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INTRODUCTION THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS under informational constraints is one of the leading textbook examples of public economics. How should a society made of several agents with heterogeneous tastes for a public good design an incentive mechanism to induce truthful revelation of the agents' valuations? Does efficiency conflict with incentives? How can this conflict, if any, be solved? Finally, what is the distribution of informational rents induced by asymmetric information?
One striking feature of most previous works on these issues is that they deal mainly with the case where agents are unable to form coalitions to collectively manipulate the decision rule.2 By focusing on the role of individual incentive constraints, an important dimension of resource allocation in society has been neglected: the formation of groups. It is particularly troublesome when these coalitions can significantly reduce the efficiency of the optimal mechanism designed in the absence of coalition incentiL)e constraints. As Olson (1965, p. 1) has forcefully emphasized "groups of individuals with common inter-ests usually attempt to further tdose commzon interests [ ] and are expected to act on behalf of their conmmon interests much as single individuals are often expected to act on behalf of their personal interest." Following this argument, the standard theoretical framework must be amended to allow also for the formation of groups promoting their own collective goals instead of that of society as a whole. The present paper offers a framework in which the consequences of collusion under asymmetric information on both allocative efficiency and the distribution of rents in society can be assessed.
We model a conflict between a social welfare maximizer and a group of agents who benefit from the public good but who do not care about its budgetary cost. Contrary to the standard assumption in mechanism design, the planner has not a perfect control of the communication technology so that he cannot prevent the agents from colluding.3 Collusion between these agents is modeled in reduced form as in Laffont and Martimort (1997) . A third party proposes to the colluding agents a side-mechanism to collectively manipulate their sending of messages to the government. As suggested above, this third party does not internalize the social cost of the project but maximizes only the sum of the agents' utilities. Lastly, no technology for a credible disclosure of information is available to the colluding partners. The mere forming of a coalition does not change informational asymmetries between the agents. Coalition formation takes place under asynmmetric information.
When agents do not collude, their Bayesian-Nash behavior does not put any constraint on the set of interim individually rational and incentive compatible allocations in a con-elated infornation environnment. Indeed, as shown by Cremer and McLean (1988) in the case of auction mechanisms, the existence of even a small amount of correlation between the agents' valuations for the public good is enough to allow the principal to elicit this "almost common" information. This result is in sharp contrast with the case of uncorrelated information since then efficiency does conflict with incentives. Hence, the optimal levels of public good exhibit discontinuities when the degree of correlation goes to zero. This costless extraction of the agents' surplus by the principal suggests also that they are likely to form an active coalition in such a correlated information environment. Nevertheless, a weak collusion-proofniess principle holds in this context: any equilibrium of the overall game of contract offer cum coalition formation achieves an outcome that can be replicated with a weakly collusionproof grand mechanism, i.e., a grand mechanism such that the null side contract is a continuation equilibrium of the game of coalition formation. Since one agent's acceptance of the side contract depends on the status quo utility level 3See Palfrey (1992) for a discussion of this assumption and some of its implications in the case of Bayesian implementation. that he gets from playing noncooperatively the grand mechanism offered by the principal, the issue of learning from disagreement arises. Weakly collusion-proof mechanisms are such that the null side mechanism is a continuation equilibrium of the game of coalition formation sustained with passiive beliefs.4
The weak collusion-proofness principle provides a tractable description of the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria of the overall game of contract offer cum coalition formation. After having described this set, the principal's welfare is optimized subject to participation, individual and coalitioni incentit'e constr-aints. Generally, the efficient levels of public good can no longer be costlessly implemented even in a correlated environment. Taking into account coalition incentive constraints, there exists now a trade-off between efficiency and rent extraction. Distortions in the quantities of public good that are produced in the different states of nature reduce the cost of the binding coalition incentive constraints.
Depending on the degree of correlation, collusion-proofness constraints take quite different forms. For weak positive correlation, collusion-proofness constraints are similar to those that would arise under symmetric information within the coalition. When the degree of correlation diminishes, coalition incentive constraints are then less and less binding and the principal prevents more easily collusion. In the limit of unlcorrelated information, the principal costlessly obtains collusion-proofness and the contractual outcome is the same as if agents had not been colluding. By adding coalition incentive constraints, one moves then contintuously from the outcome with a strictly positive correlation to the outcome with no correlation:5
For strong correlation, collusion-proofness constraints under asymmetric information are instead quite different from those obtained when agents can credibly disclose their information. When the correlation becomes almost perfect, there is only a small probability that agents have different valuations for the public good. The principal can shutdown production in this state of nature at almost no social cost. This breaks the coalition agreement and almost achieves the first-best level of expected welfare.
Since it is implemented with Bayesian strategies, the optimal weakly collusion-proof contract is sensitive to the exact beliefs that the agents have at the time of playing this mechanism. Because we focus on the case where valuations for the public good may take only two values, the equilibrium correspondence of this optimal mechanism as posterior beliefs change can be fully described. This step of the analysis allows us to discuss the robustness of the optimal mechanism to a preplay communication stage in which agents may veto or ratify the truthful play of this mechanism and thereby signal some 4Rubinstein (1985) coined this expression for games with asymmetric information in which equilibrium behavior is sustained with prior beliefs out of the equilibrium path. 5Interestingly, this result requires neither risk aversion of the agents' utility functions nor limited liability constraints on transfers (Robert (1991) ). information to each other. It is then possible to show that the optimal weakly collusion-proof mechanism is stronzgly ratifiable in the sense of Cramton and Palfrey (1995) .
Collusion in public good mechanisms has been first analyzed by Green and Laffont (1979) who prove that the Groves mechanisms are not robust to coalitions when agents share freely their information. Still with dominant strategy mechanisms but with a continuum of types, Laffont and Maskin (1980) show then that only pooling decision rules can be implemented. Cremer (1996) takes into account asymmetric information within coalitions and shows that the Groves mechanisms are robust to size-two coalitions but not beyond. Similarly, there exist some relatively negative results in the case of Nash implementation when agents can form coalitions (Maskin (1979) ). The Nash environment can be seen as an extreme case of perfect correlation between the agents' types. Our focus on Bayesian implementation with two types brings more positive results.6 Under asymmetric information within the coalition, the principal can implement a much larger set of allocations in these strongly correlated environments. More generally, our approach provides a complete description of the set of implementable allocations under collusion. This paper extends Laffont and Martimort (1997) by stressing the role of correlated information between the agents as a determinant of the strength of their coalition and by making no restriction on the set of available mechanisms. In this previous work, we restricted the analysis to the case of anonymous mechanisms and uncorrelated information.7 With no correlation, there always exists a costless weakly collusion-proof implementation of the second-best noncooperative outcome if the principal can offer nonanonymous Bayesian mechanisms. However, collusion still matters when types are correlated even without any exogenous restriction on the set of mechanisms. Moreover, working in a correlated environment, we obtain a full characterization of all transfers in the optimal weakly collusion-proof mechanism. This characterization allows us to compute all the ex post rents precisely and to characterize the outcome of the grand mechanism when beliefs differ from passive ones. This is an important step towards checking the strong ratifiability of the mechanism.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 discusses the optimal mechanism when agents do not collude. Section 4 derives the weak collusion-proofness principle and characterizes weakly collusion-proof allocations. Section 5 describes the optimal weakly collusion-proof mechanism. Section 6 discusses strong ratifiability. Section 7 concludes. 6 See also Laffont and Maskin (1979) . 7Beside the differences in the informational structures and the set of available mechanisms, this previous paper was dealing with a model of regulation. This latter difference is without consequence on the results.
THE MODEL

Technology, Preferenices, and Inzformationl
We consider the provision of public good in a partial equilibrium model. A positive amount x of public good can be produced at cost cQ) with c'( ) > 0 and c"( ) > 0. There are two agents in the economy denoted by Ai, i E {1, 2}.8 Each of them derives utility Ui = Oix -ti from consuming an amount x of public good and paying tax ti. Agent Ai agrees to participate in the public good mechanism when his participation constraint is satisfied.
The agents' valuations for the public good, Oi, i E {1, 2}, are drawn from a common knowledge joint distribution on 6)2 where 6 = {o, 0} is the common support of 01 and 02 (AO = 0-0). We refer to the probabilities p(Oi, Oj) of each state (0i, O0), for (i, j) E {1, 2}2, as the common knowledge prior beliefs. To make notation simpler, we also write: p ( We denote by p=PiiP22,Pl2 the degree of positive correlation (p =0 for independent types). For simplifying technicalities, we also assume that 0 < P12 ?PI.9 The conditional beliefs of agent Ai on AJ's type (j #& i) induced by the joint distribution above are the same for both agents and, slightly abusing notations, are denoted by p.
The government, or principal P, only knows the distribution of the agents' valuations for the public good but is uninformed on the exact realizations of these shocks at the time of choosing the public good mechanism. His objective is to maximize the sum of the agents' utilities knowing that the deficit for the production of the public good must be covered by distortionary taxation raised elsewhere in the economy. Formally, the social welfare function is written as SW=~ Li= 1Ui -(1 ? A)(c(x) -Li9 1t1), where A is the exogenous cost of public funds.1?
Restricting to two agents avoids considering the formation of subcoalitions and significantly simplifies notations. However, our methodology could be extended to more than two agents at the cost of an increase in complexity.
9This assumption ensures that the optimal collusion-proof mechanism under asymmetric information never entails bunching in the case of small correlation. It simplifies significantly the exposition. 
Mechanismzs
The principal proposes a grand mechanism G to the agents. G maps any pair of messages (nil, in2) belonging to the product message space MI X M2 = M (where Mi denotes the message space used by agent A,) into a triplet {x, tl, t2}. x denotes the amount of public good produced (x E X = R) and ti (i E {1, 2}) is the tax paid by agent Ai to the principal. We denote by G {x(*), t1(), t9( )} this grand mechanism.
To make notation simpler in the case of direct mechanisms (M = 6) X 6)), we denote by x, x, and x respectively the levels of public good when both agents claim 0, when their claims differ (0, 0) and when they both claim 0. We also denote by tkl for k, I E {1, 2} the tax paid by an agent whose type is Oi = 0 + (2 -k)AO when the other agent's type is Oj = 0 + (2 -1) AO. Because of symmetry between the agents, the corresponding taxes are independent of the agents' From the revelation principle, there is no loss of generality in assuming that S is a direct mechanism.13 Therefore 4Q) and Yk ) (k E {1, 2}) map 6)2 respectively into the set of measures on M and the set of balanced side transfers.
Lastly, T is benevolent and maximizes the sum U, + U2 of the two colluding agents' utilities obtained by playing the composition of the grand and the side mechanism.14 I Note that we do not restrict a priori the set of mechanisms available to the set of direct mechanisms. Other message spaces than the product of the agents' type spaces 2 can be used by the principal.
I' The symmetry of the grand mechanism is without loss of generality under noncooperative behavior as we will see below. We also show in the Appendix that it is without loss of generality in the case of collusion for a small correlation. The amount of public good does not need to depend on the identity of who has a high valuation for the public good when claims differ. 13 For any grand mechanism offered by the principal, one can restrict the third party to use direct side mechanisms at the final stage of the game of contract offer cum coalition formation.
14 Using this third party as a side contract mechanism designer avoids the difficult issue ofinformational leakages through contract offers. It eliminates also the problem of finding all extensive form for describing the collusive game between the agents. This third party paradigm can be seen as a black box for the repeated interaction by which collusion emerges. This is a modeling shortcut to justify also our assumption that the side contract is in fact enforceable even if there is no court of justice available to do so. This modeling characterizes the highest bound that can be achieved by the coalition. 
Timing of the Game
The timing of the overall game of contract offer cum coalition formation is as follows (see also Figure 1 for the game tree):
1. Agents learn their respective valuations for the public good. 2. P proposes a grand mechanism G. If an agent vetoes the grand mechanism, all agents get their reservation utility normalized exogenously at zero.
3. The third party proposes a side mechanism S to the agents and a noncooperative continuation play of G if anyone refuses this side contract. If both agents accept S, agents report their types to the third party who recommends reports into the grand mechanism and who commits to enforce the corresponding side transfers.
4. Reports are sent into the grand mechanism. The decision on the size of the public good is made and taxes are paid by the agents. Side transfers, if any, are implemented.
The third party's offer of a side mechanism S on top of the grand-mechanism G induces a two stage game F(G, S). In the first ratification stage, agents simultaneously accept or refuse the side mechanism and may thereby signal their types to each other. In the second communication stage, agents send messages either directly to the principal if at least one of them has refused the side mechanism or to the third party if both have accepted. The third party recommends then a collective manipulation of the messages to be sent to the principal. We denote by E(G, S) the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria of F(G, S).
We are interested in finding the optimal mechanism G, knowing that the continuation game of coalition formation consists first of a side mechanism S optimally chosen by the third party and second of a ratification-communication game F(G,S).
Note first that we eliminate equilibria based on weakly dominated strategies at stage 3 of the overall game. Indeed, for any grand-mechanism G, there always exists a continuation equilibrium of the game of coalition formation in which each agent refuses any collusive offer he may receive because he expects that the other agent also refuses this offer anyway. Second, following Ai's rejection, Aj (j Oi) may have updated his beliefs on Ai's type. These beliefs affect the noncooperative play of the grand mechanism G and therefore the status quo payoffs that Ai gets following a rejection of the side-mechanism S. Therefore, there may exist several side-mechanisms offered as continuation equilibria of the game of coalition formation depending on what is learnt following the rejection of these side-mechanisms. an equilibrium ei E E(G, pi, p-i). Note that this interim payoff is computed as an expectation with respect to prior beliefs. Indeed, because joint deviations have probability zero in a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, nothing has been learned on A following Ai's refusal. Therefore, the deviant agent Ai still continues to play the grand mechanism with his prior beliefs on A _i's type.
We are interested in collusive continuation equilibria in which no learning occurs from the agreement of playing the side-mechanism S. We can thus define similarly r(G 5S, p, p) the game of asymmetric information induced by the composition of the grand-mechanism G and the side mechanism S at stage 4' following acceptance of playing S by both agents. E(G o S, p, p) denotes similarly the set of Bayesian-Nash equilibria of F(G o S, p, p). Since the revelation principle applies at the last stage of the game, there is no loss of generality in considering that E(G ? S, p, p) contains the truthful equilibrium e*. Let Ui(Oi) denote agent A 's payoff in this equilibrium when his type is Oi.
NO-COLLUSION AND THE FIRST-BEST OUTCOME
It is by now a well known result that the optimal mechanism achieves the first-best outcome in this correlated environment when the implementation concept is Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, even with interim individual rationality constraints (Cremer and McLean (1988) ).15 The key is to use agent A2's report, which is truthful in equilibrium, as a signal correlated with agent Al's type and to condition A1's taxes on this information. The flexibility in the taxes paid in the different states of nature can then be used to "stochastically" and costlessly deter any incentive to lie. If agent Al does not report truthfully his type, the mechanism is designed so that he gets a negative expected payoff. Since this ingenious trick can be used for each agent simultaneously, the revelation of both agents' types obtains at no cost for the principal.
Obviously, the taxes paid by the agents may be quite large when types become almost uncorrelated.16 Indeed, the conditional probability that agents have the same types diminishes and the punishments (or rewards) in the different states of nature must increase to induce revelation.
We provide thereafter a simple proof of this first best implementation in our public good setting. To do that, we first need to describe the set of implementable allocations in this noncooperative context. Without collusion, the revelation principle yields a characterization of the set of implementable allocations with individual incentive compatibility constraints only. Consider the Bayesian incentive compatibility constraint of agent A_ when he has a high valuation 0 for the public good.17 Multiplying it by p(O) = P + P 12 > 0, this constraint writes as To implement the first-best outcome, the participation constraints (3) and (4) must be binding and we look for solutions such that the incentive constraints (1) and (2) are also binding.19 Then the existence of some strictly positive correlation imposes that the system of linear binding constraints (l)-to-(4) is in fact invertible. This invertibility ensures that the first-best schedule of public goods can be implemented at zero cost for the principal.
The taxes that implement this optimal allocation of public good are highly dependent on the information structure. When correlation becomes weaker, taxes become increasingly punishing when both agents claim 0 and when the agent who pays the tax claims 0 and the other claims 0. On the contrary, agent Ai is increasingly rewarded when both agents claim being 0 and when he claims 0 and Aj (j ] i) claims 0. Indeed, with positive correlation, it becomes easier to induce revelation from a 0 agent Ai if, when he lies, he is heavily punished when facing a 0 agent Aj (j 0 i) who truthfully reveals.
Even a very small amount of correlation can be used to threaten the agents of being heavily punished for lying on their types and to achieve the first best allocation. However, with no correlation, allocative distortions become necessary to reduce a 0 agent's costly informational rent. Therefore, in this noncooperative setting, the optimal mechanism fails to be continuous with respect to the information structure.
For notational convenience, let A denote the probability of a high valuation type in the case of no correlation. We have thus Pul PI" =P21 -P _p.
18 From the symmetry of the model, these incentive anid participation constraints are the same for both agents. 19 Cremer and McLean (1988) show in fact that incentive constraints can be slack. Without any correlation, the system of binding equations (1) to (4) can no more be inverted. Only expected taxes are defined from the binding incentive (1) and participation constraints (4) and a 0 agent's informational rent becomes costly. Allocative distortions of x and x are needed to reduce this cost.
COLLUSION
Because the agents get zero rent from the mechanism proposed by the principal if they play noncooperatively, they are willing to coordinate their messages to countervail the principal's power. The optimal grand mechanism with a noncooperative behavior creates endogenously the stakes for some collusive behavior.
The Thircl-Pacrty's Problenm
Following Cramton and Palfrey (1995), we say that a side-mechanism S is unanimously ratified for (e , e, P1 I2) if, for all 0i E 6) and all i, In other words, G is weakly collusion-proof if and only if the third-party offers the null side mechanism and there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in E(G, SO) such that agents accept to play e* sustained with passive beliefs out of the equilibrium path. PROPOSITION 3: To characterize the outcome of any peifect Bayesian equilibrium of the game of grand mechanism offer cum coalition formation such that a collusive continuation equilibrium occurs on the equilibrium path, there is no loss of generality in restricting the principal to offer weakly collusion-proof mechanisms.
The logic behind this weak collusion-proofness principle is similar to that underlying the standard revelation principle: any equilibrium of the overall game of grand mechanism offer cum side contracting gives an allocation that can be replicated with a direct grand mechanism G offered by the principal himself. This grand mechanism is such that the coalition still forms at the ratification stage of F(G, SO) and each agent Ai finds it optimal to report his valuation Oi truthfully to the principal thereafter.
One could argue that agents' information is not only restricted to their own valuations but also includes the knowledge of the side mechanism they use to collude. The principal could try to elicit this information by also asking the agents which side mechanism they are actually playing. But the third party could react by inducing further manipulations of those reports of the side mechanism. These reactions and counterreactions lead naturally to a problem of infinite regress. By restricting the principal to use grand mechanisms only contingent on the agents' valuations, we cut arbitrarily this process in favor of the colluding agents. This amounts to an incomplete contracting assumption that fits our desire to give collusive behavior its best chance.20 Within this incompleteness contractual framework, we are nevertheless able to generalize the revelation principle and benefit from the weak collusion-proofness principle to obtain a simple constructive characterization of the set of implementable allocations.
The next proposition characterizes this set in the case of symmetric grand mechanisms. If e > 0, the Bayesian incentiVe compatibility constraint (1) of a 0 agent is binding.
The weakly collusion-proof mechanisms described above are such that a 0 agent's incentive constraint is not binding. Only a 0 agent's incentive constraint may be binding. These mechanisms are the only ones that are of interest as Proposition 5 will confirm.
The parameter e is a discount factor less than one which captures the fact that collusion takes place under asymmetric information. True valuations must be replaced by virtual valuations21 in the coalition incentive conistraints (6) and (7). The third party problem (T) is constrained by the reservation utilities that the agents obtain from playing noncooperatively the grand mechanism and the incentive compatibility constraint at the coalition formation stage. Virtual valuations are then lower than true valuations to take into account the costly multipliers of these constraints.
In the sequel, the downward coalition incentive constraints (rewritten after having used the symmetry of the grand mechanism) are of particular interest:
-t2 -t2 + (Oo+ 0-P e A) x 2-2t2 + ?(+ 0-P E AO) x.
(8) says that a coalition made with two 0 agents prefers telling collectively the truth to the principal rather than lying and telling that one of the agents is 0. (9) says that a (0, 0) coalition prefers telligg the truth rather than claiming that both agents are 0. The logic of the first-best noncooperative implementation described in Section 2 is to offer large penalties and large rewards depending on the states of nature to induce revelation. For instance, the formula for t11 (resp. t29) in the Appendix shows that this tax may become extremely large and positive (resp. negative) when the agents' types are less and less correlated. This suggests that the coalition incentive constraint (8) (resp. (9)) is likely to be binding at the optimum of the principal's problem. The extent to which the principal is restricted in using Bayesian transfers comes from the existence of these coalition incentive constraints.
Once coalition incentive constraints are characterized, it is useful to derive necessary monotonicity conditions for the implementability of a schedule of outputs. i.e., for e laige en-ough; otherwise it remainls increaising.
The striking feature of this corollary is that, in the case of strong correlation (i.e., when P,2 is small enough), non-monotonic schedules of outputs can be implemented by the principal if he chooses e large enough. The reason for this non-monotonicity is that virtual valuations coming from the formation of the coalition under asymmetric information are no longer ranked in the same order as true valuations. When agents' types are almost perfectly correlated, the probability that they both get a high valuation for the public good is large. Henceforth, the incentive constraint of a 0 agent willing to mimic a 0 one at the coalition formation stage is also very costly to the third-party from an ex ante point of view. Inducing revelation within the coalition requires therefore large distortions of the optimal manipulation of reports 0"(0, 0) with respect to what the third-party could implement under symmetric information. Hence, the sum of the virtual valuations of a (0, 0) coalition may become smaller than that of a (0, 0) one.
This nonmonotonicity property will create a substantive difference between collusion under symmetric and asymmetric information when the correlation is strong contrary to the case of a weak correlation.
THE OPTIMAL WEAKLY COLLUSION-PROOF MECHANISM
We now turn to some normative analysis and optimize the principal's welfare subject to Bayesian individual incentive, participation, and coalition incentive constraints. In the sequel, we focus only on the 0 agent's Bayesian incentive constraint (1), the downward coalition incentive constraints (8) In the sequel, we focus separately on these two polar cases of weak and strong correlations.
Weak Conrelation
Solving the principal's problem with standard Lagrangean techniques yields Proposition 5. Binding Conistr-ainits: The fact that both coalitions (0, 0) and (0, 0) are prevented from misreporting limits the feasible transfers that could be used by the principal to extract the agents' information. tl? cannot be made largely positive as it is in the no-collusion outcome without violating the coalition incentive constraint (11). A (0, 0) coalition would like to avoid bearing these detrimental punishments by mimicking a (0, 0) coalition. (11) must be binding at the optimum. Similarly, a (0, 0) coalition would like to mimic a (0, 0) one to get the corresponding large rewards requested in the no-collusion outcome since t22 is then large and negative. (12) must thus also be binding.
Because of these constraints on the set of transfers, a 0 agent must be given a strictly positive rent contrary to the case without collusion. Large rewards and punishments can no longer be used by the principal without violating the coalition incentive constraints.
Coalition Incentive Constr-aints: For a weak correlation, e = 0 at the optimum. Indeed, there is no gain in having e strictly positive since this would only increase the cost of the coalition incentive constraint (12).23 Interestingly, the binding collusion-proofness constraints take therefore the same form as if agents could credibly share their information within the coalition. Everything happens as if asymmetric information does not really undermine the ability of the group to form. However, the agents' participation constraints being the interim ones, they differ from the case of symmetric information within the coalition.
Output Distortions: Distorting downward x and x below their first-best values reduces the costs of the individual (10) and coalitional incentive (11) and (12) constraints. The size of the public good must be reduced because of asymmetric information and collusion. Note that this result contrasts with the usual free-rider phenomenon discussed in the literature. As shown for instance in Mailath and Postlewaite (1990), the reduction in the size of the public good is then due to the conflict between individual incentive and individual participation constraints. Here, distortions come from the conflict between coalitional incentive and individual participation constraints. It is because a coalition can form that individual incentives become costly to provide and that allocative distortions are needed in this correlated environment.
Role of the Correlationi: This conflict between coalition incentive and participation constraints increases with the amount of positive correlation between the agents' types. When types are more positively correlated, the distortion required on xc to reduce the cost of the coalition incentive constraint (11) is larger since P12 is smaller (see (14) ). The distortion on xc needed to reduce the cost of the coalition incentive constraint (12) is instead rather small since P22 is now relatively large (see (15)). Instead, (21) and (22) show that the optimal weakly collusion-proof contract is such that the dominant strategy incentive constraints of a 0 agent are always strictly satisfied. This dominant strategy requirement for one type somewhat simplifies the optimal mechanism since this type's equilibrium strategy is not sensitive to the exact beliefs that agents have at the time of playing the mechanism.
Nevertheless, the ex post rent of a 0 agent A, depends also explicitly on A2's type. For instance, just as in the no-collusion outcome, two 0 agents are given strictly positive ex post rents. These agents are still subsidized for the consumption of the public good. On the contrary, a 0 agent AI facing a 0 agent A2 makes a negative ex post profit. The tax he pays for the public good is very large and his final utility is negative. Intuitively, by setting u2 negative, the principal insures that (11) is not veiy costly. Satisfying the 0 agent's interim participation constraint requires then to set u strictly above zero.
The Polar Case of No Correlation]
In the degenerate case of no correlation, a rather striking result obtains: PROPOSITION 6: With no correlation betweeni the agents' types ( p = 0), the optinal weakly collusion -proof grand mechanism G* entails the same strictly decreasing schedule of outputs as without collusion, xo =xo , xO xO
Only the individual incentive (10) and the participation constraints (13) are strictly binding. The multipliers of the coalition incentive constraints (11) and (12) are zero at the optimum of (P). Nonanonymous transfers implement in a Bayesian and weakly collusion-proof way the optimal second-best contract, i.e., the noncooperative outcome obtained when there is no correlation between the agents' types. Collusion has no impact when agents do not know more information on each other than what is available to the principal. Intuitively, everything happens as if the principal sells the mechanism to the third party so that the latter perfectly internalizes the social welfare objective. Strikingly, the optimal policy moves continuously from the case with positive correlation to the case without correlation when coalition incentive constraints are taken into account. Allowing collusion restores continuity of the optimal contract with respect to the information structure. 
The Polar Case of Almnost Peifect Col7Telation
With an almost perfect correlation (P12 close to zero), both agents have almost always the same type.
As a benchmark, suppose first that the agents can credibly exchange information on their types because, for instance, the third party is endowed with a technology making this information verifiable within the coalition.25 Assume also that agents agree to play the grand mechanism26 before they learn each other's types so that their participation constraints remain unchanged with respect to 5.1. Collusion-proofness constraints must now be written with true valuations instead of virtual ones. This has two implications: First, the binding downward coalition-proofness constraints take the same form as (11) and (12) when e= 0. Second, monotonicity of the schedule of outputs (x ? &^ ? x) is now always necessary for implementability.
If this monotonicity constraint would not be binding at the optimum, the optimal levels of public good would still be given by (14) and (15). However, 24 Coalition incentive constraints somehow compactify the set of feasible allocations just as risk aversion or limited liability does (see Robert (1991) ).
-5 We assume also that information disclosure only takes place when the agents decide to collude. It implies that the grand-contract must still satisfy the individual Bayesian incentive constraints. 26 Note that we restrict the grand mechanisms to use reports by each agent on his own information only. This restriction is justified if the disclosure of information does not occur with probability one. Unrestricted grand mechanisms using both agents' reports on their own types and what they have learned on their colluding partner are useless in this case. Indeed, the coalition, when it forms, can always pretend that it did not so that both agents' messages on what they have learned is always uninformative. when P12 is small enough, it is easy to check that the monotonicity constraint x > x would be violated. Hence, we get Proposition 7. Taking into account collusion-proofness constraints under symmetric information in an almost perfectly correlated environment undermines quite significantly the achievement of the efficient outcome. The optimal allocation entails now lots of pooling. When the agents' types are strongly correlated, we have seen in Section 2 that rewards and punishments necessaiy to implement the first-best outcome are relatively small. However, when agents collude under symmetric information, their collusion becomes now also harder to prevent. As a result, the optimal collusion-proof mechanism becomes less responsive to their messages. In this framework, the optimal contract looks like an incomplete contract making only partial use of the information.27
Things are quite different under asymmetric information within the coalition. For a strong correlation, the principal can now offer non-monotonic schedules of outputs in a collusion-proof way. In particular, cancelling the production of the public good when agents' types are different and still keeping a positive production when types are the same becomes a valuable option. This strategy is not very costly from an ex ante allocative point of view since P12 is small. However, it relaxes quite significantly (12) when E is positive. When P12 is almost zero, the right-hand side of (12) is so largely negative that this coalition incentive constraint does not matter any more for the principal.28 a1 can be set at a very large negative value and still this constraint can be easily satisfied. Choosing such a punishment in case of different reports also relaxes quite significantly (11) and the principal's problem is almost as without collusion.
Since collusion does not affect too much social welfare, the principal can set xc to a level close to its first best value x-'. The punishments for claiming to have different types are so effective that a 0 agent's expected rent is now close to zero. Therefore, with almost perfect correlation, the optimal collusion-proof contract achieves an ex ante social welfare close to its full information value.
ROBUSTNESS
We focus in this section on the case of a small correlation.
Multiplicity of Equilibria of G
When played with passive beliefs, the optimal weakly collusion-proof mechanism G * has several pure strategy equilibria, i.e., IE(Gu', p, p)f > 1. The first one is the truthful symmetric equilibrium e* that we have derived above. However, there exist also two asymmetric nontruthful pure strategy equilibria. el (resp. e*) is one such equlibrium where A, (resp. A,) always claims to be a 0 agent and A, (resp. A,) reveals truthfully his type.
Indeed, from (21) and (22), a 0 agent always claims truthfully his type. A 0 agent A2 anticipates that Al always claims 0. Then, from (17), he reports truthfully. Thus, agent A2 always reveals his type. Anticipating that A, always reveals his type, from the binding constraint (10), a 0 agent A, is indifferent between lying or not and lies in this equilibrium.
In this asymmetric equilibrium, denoted thereafter e", Al gets the same ex ante and interim payoffs as in e*, U1(01, e") = U(01) for all 01. Instead, AX's interim payoffs differ from that in e*. Indeed, we have U2(0, e*) = tu < U(O) -(pu P2a (p1 +p12) (from (19)) and U,(0,e*) = u > U(0) = 0 (from (20)).
However, using the values of ex post rents given in the Appendix, A2's ex ante payoff is the same as in eK.
In fact, in equilibrium eC, a (0, 0) coalition reports (0, 0) when it is indifferent between collectively claiming (0, 0) and (0, 0) ((12) is indeed binding for the  ex post rents defined by G ) . This indifference of the coalition is broken in favor of the principal so that, among all payoff equivalent equilibria from the third-party's point of view, the agents play the most preferred by the principal. The fact that E (G ", p, p) is not a singleton is not a big problem since all these equilibria yield the same aggregate payoff to the agents.29
Stronig Collusion-Proofiiess
The fact that E(G*, p, p) is not a singleton shows also that G* is never stronlgly7 collusion-proof, i.e., E(G,, Sr) is not reduced to a singleton either. Indeed, there exist other equilibria of F(G, SO) than unanimous ratification and subsequent play of e". To show this result, it is enough to exhibit such an equilibrium of F(G", SO.) Unanimous veto of S* and subsequent play of the equilibrium e* is such an equilibrium of (G", SO) sustained with passive beliefs.
This observation suggests two things. First, the ratification stage enlarges the set of equilibria of G . Second, we should test the robustness of G* to credible equilibria of the game of coalition formation. We now turn to this issue.
Stronig Ratifiability
As we have seen above, the ratification stage of F(G , So ) adds in fact a preplay communication stage to G. At this stage, agents are allowed to make binary preplay announcements ("Veto" or "Accept") that may signal some information on their types. Cramton and Palfrey (1995) have analyzed similar mechanism design problems and have proposed the notion of strong ratifiability of a mechanism against itself to test its robustness to such a cheap-talk stage. Credibility of beliefs requires that vetoing e should be interpreted as coming from the subset of types who are the most likely to benefit from this deviation when a non-deviant agent's beliefs put all weight on this particular subset. This definition captures the rational expectation reasoning that the different types of the deviant agent make when they envision vetoing the decision rule e*. Those types who gain from vetoing e* effectively deviate and refuse to play e' with some probability when the nondeviant agent interprets these deviations in a rational way. The set of such types is called a credible ueto set. Still following Cramton and Palfrey (1995), we also have the following definition. Strong ratifiability captures the idea that no type of agent is willing to credibly veto the play of the truthful equilibrium e`. If it is strongly ratifiable, G* is robust to cheap-talk equilibria such that (possibly strict) subsets of types may deviate in a credible way.
Definition 3 is actually a step in the construction of perfect sequential equilibria made by Grossman and Perry (1986) . Therefore, G" is strongly ratifiable if and only if all perfect sequential equilibria of t(G, S*) are payoff equivalent to unanimous ratification of e*.
PROPOSITION 9: The optimal weakly collusion-pr oof gracnicd mechlanism G" is strongly ratifiable.
The proof consists in describing the equilibrium correspondence E(G*, f1, P2) when -varies. From now on, we abuse notations and denote by P (resp. p) the probability (resp. the conditional prior probability) that A2 assigns to A1 being 0. Starting from E(G, p, p) = {e *, e*, e* }, we get E(G*, fi, p) = {e*} for optimistic beliefs j3, >p and E(G",k1,,p) = {e-,e*} for pessimistic beliefs P1 < P. The characterization of this correspondence makes it easier to isolate the veto. sets that can credibly refuse to play e*. A 0 agent A, cannot be a credible veto set since G* has a unique equilibrium e* when A2 holds optimistic beliefs on A1 and this equilibrium gives to a 0 agent A1 strictly less utility than e". On the contrary, a 0 agent A, can be a credible veto set since G* has e* and e4 for equilibria when A, holds pessimistic beliefs on A1. However, by refusing to ratify e-, this credible veto set cannot obtain more utility than following unanimous ratification of e* since, with pessimistic beliefs, we have E(G-, P p) ={e-, e*} and both equilibria yield payoff U(O, e4) = U(0) to a 0 agent AI anyway.
CONCLUSION
When agents collude to influence collective decision on public goods and their valuations for the public good are positively correlated, there exists a trade-off between efficiency and rent extraction. The optimal weakly collusion-proof contract depends on the degree of correlation.
This correlation is also a crucial determinant of the group's ability to collude. In particular, a strong positive correlation allows the principal to use asymmetric information within the coalition to undermine significantly its countervailing power.
Adding coalition incentive constraints restores also continuity between the correlated and the uncorrelated information environments. Collusion does not matter in an uncorrelated environment with risk-neutral agents and the noncooperative outcome is implementable in a collusion-proof way.
The benefit from focusing on a discrete two type modeling of asymmetric information is twofold. First, it has given us a tractable characterization of the set of collusion-proofness constraints. Second, it is also a key simplification to test the robustness of the optimal mechanism to some form of preplay communication since it becomes then possible to fully describe the equilibrium correspondence of the optimal weak collusion-proof mechanism G* when beliefs change.
Many lessons of this paper are independent of the specifics of the model, like the principal's objective function or the preferences of agents within the coalition. Therefore, these results would also go through in other environments like auctions, regulation of duopoly, design of incentive schemes within the firm, and arbitration mechanisms. More generally, our results suggest that collusion stakes always exist in those correlated environments and that the efficiency of yardstick mechanisms depends significantly on the amount of correlation. 
IDEI, GREAIQ, Universite des Scienzces
P12t21 +P22t22 =0 (P12 +P22X), * S* is a side mechanism that, since the revelation principle applies at the last stage of the game, can be taken as being a direct mechanism mapping 6) x 6) into the set of measures on message spaces. Let e* be its truthful equilibrium. S" maximizes the sum of the agents' expected utilities subject to individual Bayesian incentive constrainits, budget balance, and individual rationality constraints Uj(oi) 2 Ui(oi, ei) for some ei E E(G, jP, p_ j) and some {pI, p2}. * {P1, P,} is the system of out-of-equilibrium posterior beliefs used respectively by agent A, and A1 to assess respectively Al and A,'s type following their respective veto of the side mechanism S'. These are the beliefs used in the noncooperative play of G to compute the status quo payoffs Uj(6i, ei).
* Consider now the new grand mechanism G * -S. We prove that there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the overall game of contract offer cum coalition formation in which the principal offers G, which is a direct mechanismii from 6) x 6) into D = X x T?, the third party offers the null side-mechanism S() = {0 = Id, y = 01 and this choice is sustained by passive beliefs, PI =P2 =p. Because S * solves (T) with reservationi utilities Uj(0i, e1), the null side mechanism solves (T) with reservation utilities U( 6). Indeed, suppose it is not the case; then there would exist a side meclhanism S such that the third party can achieve a strictly greater payoff for the coalition than with S`. Since by definitioni Uj(0) 2 Uj(0, ei) the third party's payoff from offering S` S in the first place would be strictly greater than that achieved with S'-. This would contradict that S* is optimal when G* is offered. * Hence, offering the grand mechanism G insures to the principal that there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the continuation game sustained with passive beliefs in which the null side mechanism is unanimously ratified.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4 AND COROLLARY 1: We first solve for the third-party's optimal side mechanism sustained by a reversion to a noncooperative equilibrium of the mechanism G() played with passive beliefs. Then, we identify conditions such that S" = {0 = Id, Yk = 01, i.e., the null side mechaniism, is the solution to (T). We conclude by deriving the monotonicity conditions that must be satisfied by such a weakly collusion-proof contract.
* Since, we are not interested in grand-mechaniisms such that the 0 agent incentive constrainit is binding (this constraint will be satisfied ex post), we write the third-party's problem as ( In the sequel, we consider symmetric grand mechanisms such that El = 'E, = E and t,( 60) t2( 62, 0 1).31 We then have Lastly, monotonicity of the decision rule and the fact that (11) and (12) are biniding ensure that the other coalition incentive constraints are satisfied.
ASYMMETRIC GRAND MECHANISMS: One may wonider whether the principal could nlot prevent collusion in a cheaper way by offering a grand mechanism that treats differently both agents still keeping a symmetric decision rule. In particular, we would have some flexibility in setting El 0 , and asymmetric transfers in all states of nature. For a weak correlation, one can show that the same monotonicity conditions as Linder symmetric informationi within the coalition can be derived, namely x >? ?x. Again, the costs of the coalition incentive constraints involving a (0, 0) coalition are minimized when El = 0. = ?-There is then a simple argument showing that, in fact, there is always a symmetric mechanism that does at least as well for the principal. First note that the principal's payoff depends only on the sum of the agents' ex post rents. Suppose indeed that the optimal weak collusion-proof grand-mechanism is then asymmetric. Let us denote by Gi this mechanism. Because of symmetry, another mechanism G* obtained by permuting agents is also a solution. The grand mechanism +G-+? G* obtained by averaging ex post rents with an equal weight is symmetric. Moreover, it is also individually incentive compatible for both agents and satisfies the same coalition incentive constraints as G"<. Hence, it achieves the same welfare as G* and G*. Finally, there is no loss of generality in looking for optimal symmetric mechanisms in the case of a weak correlation. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION
